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Truth and reconciliation commissions have played a critical role in
a number of countries that had to come to terms with a past marked by
protracted conflict, civil strife, violence, and massive human rights abuse.
The most widely known example is the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission established in 1995 in South Africa to examine Apartheid-Era
crimes.' In the past, truth commissions were used to investigate human
rights violations in a variety of countries. In particular the commissions
were used after countries had undergone major political changes, namely
transition from an authoritarian regime to democratic rule, be it in the
wake of violent internal conflicts, or a gradual peaceful revolution when
civilian leadership took over from a military regime.2
The International Human Rights Law Institute at DePaul
University in Chicago undertook an empirical study on international and
non-international conflicts since World War II. This study shows that
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1. National Unity And Reconciliation Act, No. 1111, (July 26, 1995) (available on the
internet, Truth And Reconciliation Commission Home Page <http://www.truth.org.za/>).
2. Priscilla Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study,
in 1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 225-61, 600-11, 613-33, 635-55 (Neil J. Kritz ed. 1994).
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from 229 international and internal conflicts, excluding the classic inter-
state armed conflicts, nine were the subject of a truth commission, and
twenty-four were the subject of a national inquiry commission, while
twenty-two were the subject of domestic prosecution and two of
international prosecution. For many of these conflicts, of course, there
were no redress mechanisms in place., A large number of new democratic
governments, namely in Latin America, vested in truth commissions to
examine human rights violations after they came to power., In some cases,
the establishment of a commission seemed to give proof of the
government's political will to bring human rights offenders to justice, but
the decision-makers changed their policy shortly after and granted
amnesties for the perpetrators.' In other countries, the legislature had
already enacted blanket amnesties for human rights abuse. Later, a new
government set up a commission to investigate those crimes and to provide
reparation for victims.6 In connection with the collapse of the Soviet
Union, many Eastern European countries adopted democratic political
systems and found themselves confronted with the human rights abuses of
their former communist regimes. Truth commissions are not as popular in
Eastern Europe as they have been in Latin-America. Only a few states set
up investigative commissions, for instance, Lithuania, in 1991, to
investigate collaboration with the KGB,' or Germany, in 1992, to examine
the impact of communist dictatorship on society and to foster the process
of German unification These examples show the wide range of different
3. Jennifer Balint, An Empirical Study on Conflicts (of an international and non-
international character, civil conflicts and tyrannical regime victimization) and their outcomes
since WWI, REPORTS ON THE UNITED STATES MEETING OF EXPERTS ON REIGNING IN IMPUNITY
FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, (Apr. 13, 1997)
held in Washington D.C., International Human Rights Law Institute DePaul University College
of Law, Chicago.
4. To investigative commissions in Latin-America, see Margaret Popkin Sampers &
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth as Justice: Investigatory Commissions in Latin America, 20 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 79 - 115 (1995).
5. For example, Argentina - National Commission on Disappeared Persons established in
1983, the Full Stop Law (Law No.23.492, Dec. 3, 1986, N.E.D.L.A., 1986-B, at 1100) limits
prosecution and the Due Obedience Law (Law No. 23.521, June 4, 1987, B.O., June 9, 1987)
refers to acting under superior orders as a defense.
6. For example, Chile National Commission of Truth and Reconciliation established in
1990, the Decree-Law No. 2191, Apr. 18, 1978, granted amnesty for all criminal acts from Aug.
11, 1973 to Mar. 10, 1978 (Diario Oficial No. 30.042, Apr. 19, 1978).
7. The parliamentary commission was set up on December 17, 1991 to the purge of KGB
agents. See Jozef Darski, Police Agents In The Transition Period, in UNCAPTIVE MINDS, IV,
27-28 (Winter 1991-92).




political and cultural backgrounds of states that use the instrument of a
truth commission to cope with their abusive past.
I. WHAT Do WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT TRUTH
AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS?
Truth commission is a catchy name, mostly used generically, for a
wide variety of bodies set up to investigate a past history of human rights
violations in a given country. There is no such thing as a standard truth
commission; the set-up, design, responsibilities, and mandate vary
significantly from case to case. Although the word truth commission may
convey an imprecise, even misleading image, investigating commission
might be a more adequate title, because it refers more accurately to what a
commission does. I will use the term truth commission because it is still
the most frequently used one.
Priscilla Hayner, who is an expert on truth commissions in the
United States, has come up with four primary constituting elements to
define a truth commission which I find very helpful:
A truth commission focuses on the past.
A truth commission does not concentrate on a specific
event in the past but attempts to paint an overall picture of
certain human rights violations over a period of time.
A truth commission exists for a pre-determined period of
time and ceases to exist when its mandate ends, usually
with the submission of a report of its findings; and finally
A truth commission is vested with certain authority.9
This is a description of the common features. Other features vary. Truth
commissions can be established as national commissions by a national
legislator or by an act of the executive.10 They can be set up as the
outcome of a negotiated peace accord and conducted by an international
panel like the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador in 1992." An
9. Hayner, supra note 2, at 227-28.
10. For instance, in Bolivia, the National Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances was
created by presidential decree, so was the Argentinian National Commission on the Disappeared
in 1983: Uruguay established the Investigative Commission on the Situation of Disappeared
People and its Causes through act of parliament in 1985.
11. Created through the Peace Accord between FMLN and the Salvadoran government
under the mediation of the United Nations, signed at Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City on Jan.
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alternative to the case-by-case negotiated or established commission was a
Permanent International Truth Commission which would provide for a
ready-made framework that could be brought to life if so requested by a
state. 
2
National funds or international organizations could sponsor these
organizations. Exceptional is the case of the 1993 commission of inquiry
in Rwanda. A coalition of four non-governmental organizations, Africa
Watch (United States), Centre International des Droits des la Personne et
du Developpement Democratique (Canada), Federation Internationale des
Droits de l'Homme (France), and Union Interafricaine des Droits de
l'Homme et des Peuples (Burkina Faso) set up the International
Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations."
They range from elaborate multi-body commissions such as the
1995 Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa14 to one-man-
commissions with very limited resources as in Honduras ."5
II. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF A TRUTH COMMISSION?
A truth commission usually serves many different purposes. Its
main function is to investigate past human rights abuses, not with an aim to
prosecute individuals, but to find out the truth about certain events, for
example, when and where did what happen? Who was involved, as a
perpetrator, or as a victim? A truth commission is first of all an
instrument to examine the facts about the crimes and atrocities that have
occurred in a country. The second important purpose is to give a report of
these findings, publish it, and confront the public with the truth. This
exposure to the facts is supposed to have a cathartic and educational effect
on the society in transition. The impact of such a record would be the
basis for the third important purpose of a truth commission: which is the
acknowledgment of the past. Acknowledgment in this context means that
16, 1992; report of the Commission submitted to the United Nations on Mar. 13, 1993, U.N.
Doc. S/25500.
12. See Michael P. Scharf, The Case For A Permanent International Truth Commission, 7
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 375-410 (1987).
13. Hayner, supra note 2, at 243, n.78.
14. Supra note 1. According to chapter 2, section 3, paragraph 3 of the Act, the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission consists of three separate commissions with
different functions: the Commission of Human Rights (ch. 2, sec. 3, para. 3, sub-para. (a)), the
Commission for Amnesty, (ch. 2, sec. 3, para. 3, sub-para. (b)), and the Commission for
Reparation and Compensation (ch. 2, sec. 3, para. 3, sub-para. (c)).
15. National Commissioner for the Protection of Human Rights in Honduras, preliminary
report: The Facts Speak For Themselves - The Preliminary Report on Disappearances of the
National Commissioner for the Protection of Human Rights in Honduras, CENTER FOR JUSTICE
& INTERNATIONAL LAW (CEJIL), HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AMERICAS (1994).
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the government admits the misdeeds of the past, and that the society
accepts its involvement and recognizes the consequences of its
involvement.' 6 Acknowledgment is finally the first step to reconciliation.
It is the key to the healing process in a conflict stricken society.
Additionally, truth commissions would have the mandate to offer
recommendations for rebuilding society, for instance recommendations on
how to improve the judicial system of a country or to protect human rights
in the future more effectively.
III. WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF TRUTH
COMMISSIONS?
The success of a truth commission depends upon the political will,
financial resources, and support of the society. If the political leadership
in a country is determined to examine human rights violations and has the
tenure to promote such an undertaking within society and against the
resistance of opposing stakeholders, a truth commission will be a valuable
tool to start the recovery process. The beauty of a commission is that it
can be established almost instantly at a relatively low cost. It is a
temporary institution with a limited mandate that can be designed
according to the specific needs of a society.
The proceedings before a commission do not have to follow the
rigid rules of the law of criminal procedure. A commission is therefore
more flexible in hearing and accommodating witnesses, and in evaluating
evidence. 17
Although human rights literature mostly favors criminal
prosecution as the best guarantee against human rights violations in the
future, 8 atrocities of the past cannot comprehensively be captured by the
means of criminal proceedings. The reason for a criminal trial is to judge
the guilt of an individual upon the evidence presented with the result of
either acquitting or convicting that individual. However, we are talking
about crimes of a much larger scale than a murder case before a district
court. Genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious human rights
violations usually occur in a certain social climate of political oppression
and racial prejudice toward minorities. A court is not supposed to give an
16. To the issue of acknowledgment see Luc Huyse, Justice after Transition: On the
Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing with the Past, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 51-78 (1995).
17. An illustrative report on the hearings before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
in South Africa see Michael Ignatieff, Digging up the Dead, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 10, 1997,
at 84-93.
18. Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations
of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2542 (1991).
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account about the circumstances of the historic, economic, and political
reasons for a crime, nor about the involvement of different groups in the
society or political influence from the outside which may have encouraged
the perpetrators and fostered hatred and violence that made crimes such as
disappearances, torture, and mass killings possible. Giving an account,
providing explanations, and offering recommendations for a better future
are exactly the purposes of a truth commission. Thus, a truth commission
can serve purposes which a criminal trial usually cannot.
However, as much as flexibility is the strength of a truth
commission, it is its salient weakness. Contrary to a court, a truth
commission has to be vested with authority by the political decision-makers
that may not have an interest in establishing an independent and
resourceful investigating commission. Authorities may deny access to
information and confidential material. Potential witnesses before the
commission may be reluctant to testify if they are not guaranteed protection
against alleged perpetrators or members of a violent and abusive former
regime who regain political power. 19
Even if commissions come up with comprehensive reports, their
findings can only have an impact if the public takes notice and if the
policymakers allow for significant changes. Those changes include
institutional reforms, protection of human rights in the future, and
exclusion of wrongdoers of the past from positions of power, if not
criminal prosecution. Many truth commissions, namely in Latin-America,
that have done remarkable work investigating human rights abuses were
often ridiculed by national parliaments that enacted amnesty laws for
former government officials or military personnel.20 Divergent interests,
scarcity of resources, and impunity laws are certainly not only a challenge
to the work of a truth commission, but they also affect judicial proceedings
as well. 2' However, truth commissions are inherently vulnerable to
changes in political willingness. Therefore, national truth commissions are
hardly an effective policy option in weak civilian societies or countries
ravaged by civil strife. An international truth commission provided by the
international community and conducted by experts from the outside,
operating in a safe environment, may be an alternative in those cases.
19. In Argentina, victims find themselves confronted with police-officers who tortured
them and still are on duty, see Calvin Sims, Argentina's Bereft Mothers: And Now, a New Wave,
N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1997, at A4.
20. Argentina, supra note 5.
21. On the problems of the International Tribunal for Rwanda see James C. McKinley Jr.,
On 1994 Blood Bath in Rwanda, Tribunal Hews to a Glacial Pace, TIMES, Nov. 21, 1997, at Al
To the situation of the national judiciary in Rwanda by the same author, Massacre Trials in
Rwanda Have Courts on Overload, TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, at A9.
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However, without a geographical link to the conflicting society, it may not
serve its cathartic purpose as well as its national commission.2
Besides its dependence on the good-will of the political decision-
makers, a truth commission carries the risk of too high expectations.
Victims who testify before the commission may have to go through the
agony of their traumatizing experiences without obtaining relief or even
tangible benefits.23
IV. COMBINATION OF SEVERAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS
Reconciliation of conflicting groups is a long-term process which
requires complex and multifold strategies. There is no simple strategy to
healing the wounds of the past. Accordingly, decision-makers should
make use of a variety of policy options rather than focus on either criminal
prosecution or truth commission. Accountability mechanisms such as
tribunals, investigative commissions, and illustration procedures are not
mutually exclusive. All of these strategies should be combined as parts of
a comprehensive conflict management scenario.
From the perspective of a decision-maker who thinks hard about
the several policy-options and strategies for conflict management, truth
commissions are tempting because they can be tailor-made. However,
they do not fit into every situation, and an emerging democracy will have
to deal with many more urgent issues and problems than just coming to
terms with its violent past. However, they are a flexible instrument that
can be adjusted according to the specific needs of a country. There are at
least five reasons that make truth commissions particularly valuable for the
reconciliation process. First, when implemented with the necessary legal
powers and responsibilities, they are an effective tool to give an accurate
record of human rights abuses in the past, and to inform the public about
what happened. Second, besides the truth-telling function, a commission
can be an adequate forum to decide issues such as reparation,
rehabilitation, and compensation for victims.3' Third, a commission may
serve as a basis for further in-depth investigation for criminal prosecution. 2
22. Alfred P. Rubin, Dayton, Bosnia, and the Limits of Law, THE NATIONAL INTEREST
(Winter 1996/97), at 41- 46, 44.
23. Suzanne Daley, In Apartheid Inquiry, Agony is Relived but Not Put to Rest, N. Y.
TIMES, July 17, 1997, at Al.
24. An example is the Commission for Reparation and Compensation in South Africa (see
National Unity and Reconciliation Act, July 26, 1995, ch. 2, § 3, para. 3, sub-para. (c), ch. 5)
(National Unity and Reconciliation Act, supra note 1).
25. The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Res. No. 780
(1992), examined human rights abuse in Former Yugoslavia. Its report provided the prosecutors
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia with valuable information about
1998]
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The fourth argument is that it can be a very valuable instrument to fight
impunity, provided that the political leadership will not compromise
justice. Even if a country is not capable of immediately prosecuting
alleged perpetrators of violent crimes committed under the auspices of the
former regime, the findings of the commission would lay the ground for
criminal prosecution. Finally, the documentation about the crimes will
educate future generations. This is especially important if those who have
lived through the nightmares of the atrocities, whether as a victim or as a
perpetrator, refuse, for whatever reason, to deal with the conflict.
the events to be further investigated. The report is reprinted in CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LAW OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 65-198 (1996); this
commission was not a truth commission, however, a truth commission could, among others,
serve the same purpose.
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